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Upon his return from the May, 1972, Moscow Summit Conference, President
Nixon announced that groundwork had been laid for a comprehensive trade agree-
ment with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter in October, 1972, the Soviet Union
and the United States signed agreements on trade' and on settlement of the former's
long-outstanding lend lease debt.' The new agreements include new understandings
between the parties on formerly insurmountable obstacles such as the Soviet repay-
ment of lend lease indebtedness, the extension of reciprocal credits by instrumental-
ities of each party, the extension of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union,
and sundry other provisions that have stood in the path of normalized trade
relations for two and a half decades. The proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 in-
troduced by the Administration in April, 1973, would provide the requisite con-
gressional approval for implementing the trade agreement's provisions concerning
the grant of most-favored-nation status and the removal of discriminatory tariffs
currently levied upon the importation of Soviet goodsY Upon approval by Congress,
the bill will signal the end of twenty-five years of artificially proscribed commercial
relationships between the world's two largest economies.
Until very recently, the subject of East-West trade has been evidenced by a great
deal of legal writing and very little actual trade. After World War II, the trade
policy of the United States with regard to communist countries remained virtually
unchanged for more than two decades. During this period the Soviet Union and
the countries that comprise the "Soviet bloc" turned to ready markets in Western
Europe, Great Britain, Japan, and elsewhere. In recent years, however, due to re-
curring Soviet crop failures, the United States, as the world's largest producer of
grain, has negotiated several large grain sales, but these sporadic shipments can
hardly be characterized as an ongoing commercial relationship. The future prospect
of a more enduring trade relation has required extensive readjustment of the legal
framework in which these new commercial arrangements will be undertaken.
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I
CHANGES IN EXPORT IMPORT LEGISLATION
A. Export Controls
Subject to popular pressures, American policy on East-West trade has never been
distinguished by clarity or logical consistency. After World War II the Congress,
mindful of the recent wartime shortages, re-enacted the then-existing emergency
export control legislation on a year-to-year basis until I949.4 In that year, Congress
passed the Export Control Act, the most comprehensive piece of export legislation en-
acted to date. The Act granted the President authority to control or even terminate any
or all United States exports on the elusive grounds of "foreign policy" or "national
security."' At the time of enactment, the Congress was concerned with the conserva-
tion of scarce commodities and avoiding exportation of goods that would contribute
to the military or economic development of the communist countries. The Act
provided for control of exports to various countries by imposing licensing require-
ments upon exporters. Since then, licensing procedures and regulations have created
an impenetrable bureaucratic thicket that would deter all but the most sophisticated or
stalwart of exportersP The 1949 Act, first enacted as a temporary measure with
successive extensions in 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, i96o, 1962, and 1965, governed the
foreign commerce of the United States for two decades.
Concern over strategic exports to Eastern Europe led to the Mutual Assistance
Control Act of 1951, also known as the Battle Act, under which embargoes on cer-
tain strategic commodities are coordinated with our allies.7 During the forties and
early fifties when European industrial capacity was severely limited, the export con-
trols over certain commodities were thought to have a retarding effect upon the
economic and military growth of world communism. However, during the later
part of the fifties and sLxties, it became increasingly apparent that the communist
countries were able to secure needed industrial and agricultural products from eager
suppliers elsewhere S The only notable result of our restrictive export practices ap-
peared to be an indirect subsidy of Western European industry at the expense of our
own producers and their foreign subsidiaries?
The Export Administration Act of 1969 represented a major shift in the approach
to exports bound for communist countries.1 ° The 1969 Act removed much of the
' For a summary of export controls through 1949 see Note, Export Controls, 58 YALE L.J. 1325
(1949).
'Export Control Act of 1949, dh. zi, 63 Stat. 7, as amended 50 U.S.C. §§ 202X-32 (1964) (expired
Dec. 3, 1969). See generally Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and
Future, 67 CoLTm. L. REV. 791 (x967).
a See Berman & Garson, Possible Eflects of the Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act Upon U.S.
Import, Export and Credit Controls, 20 VA s. L. REv. 279, 287 (1967).
7 22 U.S.C. §§ x6&-I 3 d (1970).
'See, e.g., Berman & Garson, supra note 5, at 876.
'See Brush, Implementation of the Export Administration Act of z969, 4 CONN. L. Rav. 35 (97x);
Note, Export Controls-A National Security Standard?, 12 VA. J. INr'L L. 92, 101-3 (1971).
1050 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1970), as amended 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-13 (Supp. 1973).
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negativism that had theretofore surrounded export controls. It declared that United
States policy is, "to encourage trade with all countries with which we have diplomatic
or trading relations ... ," excepting only trade with countries that the President has
found to be against the national interest or exports "which would make a significant
contribution to the military potential of any nation.. . or ... prove detrimental to
the national security . . . ."" Conspicuously absent in the language of the Act are
provisions that restrain trade in commodities that may have an economic effect
upon the recipient country. There remains, however, as a legacy of the 1949
Act a labyrinth of regulations and burdensome licensing requirements. 12 At least
for the near future, the 1969 Export Administration Act represents a cosmetic shift
in policy rather than a substantial impetus to East-West trade.
B. Import Barriers
Discriminatory tariffs levied upon communist goods constitute further imped-
iments to the development of East-West trade. 3 Anti-communist tariff walls, like
their export control counterparts, were thought to have a retardant effect upon the
spread of communism. Unable to avail itself of American markets, the Soviet bloc
countries have found Great Britain, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe
quite compatible trading partners.
Inevitably, trade between the United States and the East will be tied to balance of
payment considerations. Although current and contemplated future trade with the
Soviets will heavily favor the United States, the East European countries cannot
tolerate a trade deficit indefinitely. There are many Soviet products for which there
is a continuing American demand, such as crabmeat, timber, chemicals, and furs. It
is doubtful, however, whether the United States could import enough of these items
to create a parity in imports and exports. A potential source of parity would be in-
creased U.S. importation of the Soviet Union's vast resources of raw materials,
already in high demand by American industry. However, substantial pre-emption
of this considerable Soviet export market by the United States could present severe
ideological problems. It may be assumed that the Soviets will not be quick to export
a major portion of their share of the world's dwindling natural resources as grist for
the mills of the capitalist West. On the other hand, the American consumer may
have a difficult moral adjustment to make before there is a widespread acceptance
of commodities of communist origin. Also, the business community (which is gen-
"50 U.S.C. § 2402(X) (1970) (emphasis added).
'-See S. PisAn, COEX1STENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINFS FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND Ws'ST
123 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PISAR]; Brush, supra note 9, at 52; Note, supra note 9, at 13-19.
2sThe principal countries whose exports are subjected to the discriminatory rates are Albania, Bul.
garia, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, communist controlled portions of Southeast
Asia, Rumania, North Korea, and the U.S.S.R. Tariff Act of r93o, i9 U.S.C. § X202(3)(e) (1970).
Notably excluded from the discriminatory treatment of this statute and the sanction of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of z962 are Poland and Yugoslavia to which most-favored-nation status has been extended
pursuant to a determination by the President that such trade was "important to the national interest
and would promote the independence of such country or area from domination or control by inter-
national communism ... ." id. § i86i(b).
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erally a rather conservative segment of our society) may have difficulty finding
sufficient motivation to deal with a communist agency that represents, to them, the
antithesis of cherished capitalist ideals.14
On a long-term basis, it can be assumed that the planned economies would channel
their factors of production to meet American demands. However, at present com-
munist commodities meet severe obstacles as they enter the United States market
place. Although the United States tariff system has been revised, it still flatly dis-
criminates against goods of communist origin. Imports from the East are subject
to tariffs which are invariably at least twice that imposed upon an identical item
imported from a non-communist country.' 5
Upon passage of the proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973, the President would be
empowered to extend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, thereby elim-
inating our current exclusionary tariff walls. 6 As previously discussed, the lessen-
ing of tariffs will not result in a glut of Soviet goods upon the United States market
place. Current forecasts predict trade balances will continue to favor the United
States by a ratio of three to one, with Soviet purchases expected to aggregate at least
$x.5 billion in the period 1972-74. At present, then, increased trade with the Soviets
will be important in diminishing the now chronic balance of payments problem of the
United States, and the elimination of U.S. tariffs would not seem to represent a
threat to the American economy.
C. The Export-Import Bank
The Export Expansion Finance Act of 1971 introduced a vehicle with a sizeable
potential for spurring an increase in export commerce.' 8 The 1971 Act amends the
Export-Import Bank ("Eximbank") Act of 1945, which created a public govern-
mental corporation to aid in the financing of imports and exports. Unfortunately,.
the Bank has been subject to various countervailing political pressures. In the mid-
"See Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union, State, and Local Inter-
ference with Foreign Policy, 1i8 U. PA. L. Rae. 841, 850-51 (1970).
"Examples of prohibitive tariff rates are abundant; however, a few examples are listed below:
Commodity Non-Communist Rate Communist Rate
Whole Chicken 50 per lb. ioO per lb.
Vodka $1.25 per gal. $5.00 per gal.
Canned Tuna 6% ad valorem 25% ad valorem
Spruce Pine Lumber Free $4.00 per I,ooo ft.,
bd. measure
Cheddar, Edam, Gouda, 15% ad valorem 35% ad valorem
or Blue Cheeses
Eggs 3.50 per dozen ioO per dozen
It must be noted that there are a few areas such as in specific agricultural commodities where the com-
munist countries are given equal tariff treatment. ig U.S.C. § i2o2 (1970).
"H.R. 6767, tit. V, 93d Cong., ist Sess. (1973).
'7 White House Fact Sheet, 67 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 592, 593 (1973) [hereinafter cited as White House
Fact Sheet].
" Pub. L. No. 92-126; 85 Stat. 345 (partially codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 635 (Supp. 1973), amending
12 U.S.C. § 635 (970)).
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sixties, the Bank was prohibited from granting credit for the sale or lease of goods
to a communist country or if the goods were known to be ultimately destined for
use in a communist country, unless the President determined the transaction was
in the national interest. 9 A further blow was dealt to East-West trade in x968 when
the Bank was absolutely prohibited from extending credit to any country which traded
with a country in armed conflict with the United States. 0 This provision had the
practical effect of preventing the Bank from participating in the financing of exports
to any communist country. The 1971 Export Expansion Act may signal an awaken-
ing in the Congress to the potential of the East European markets. The Act was
fostered by a growing concern over the increasing balance of payments deficit and
dwindling export surpluses. In its report, the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee noted that few of our allies distinguished between communist and non-
communist countries in the granting of export credit, and that while trade with
Eastern Europe comprised sixteen per cent of the world market, the United States'
share was only three per cent of that total.V ' The expansion of American export trade
was being seriously restricted by monetary and statutory limitations placed upon
the Eximbank and voluntary limitations imposed upon private commercial banks
by the Federal Reserve System? 2 To expand trade financing, the Act raises the
ceiling of loan guarantees to $io billion, an increase from $3.5 billion, and the ceiling
on all financial activity to $20 billion from the former $13.5 billion level.2" The 1968
absolute prohibition on extension of credit to communist countries not in armed
conflict with the United States is abolished. Such assistance is subject only to a
presidential determination that a particular transaction or trade with a specific com-
munist country would be in the national interest?4
The October 1972 Agreement on trade included a provision for reciprocity in the
,extension of trade credits by the Eximbank and the Foreign Trade Bank of the
Soviet Union. In addition, American business concerns will be eligible for the ad-
-vancement of credit from forty state trading organizations. 0 Accordingly, President
Nixon has entered his determination that it is in the national interest for the Exim-
bank to participate in the finacing of exports to the Soviet Union. 0 Thus, by
amendment and presidential determination the entire thrust of the 1945 Act has
changed from total prohibition to positive inducement.
19 x964 Foreign Aid and Related Appropriations Act, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 88-258, 77 Stat. 862, as
amended Act of Mar. x3, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-267, § i(c), 82 Stat. 47-49. See generally PisAR xo8-sxi;
Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 297.
"
0Act of Mar. 13, 1968, Pub. L. No. 9o-267, § i(c), 82 Stat. 47-49. See generally PjsAR xo.
21 H.R. Rm. No. 303, 9 2d Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1971).
22 The Federal Reserve System in 1965 embarked upon a Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint (VFCR)
program, the effect of which was to place a ceiling on loans to foreigners approximately equivalent to a
percentage of bank assets or the value of such loans at the end of 1964. The Export Expansion Act of x971
.specifically calls for a halt to the VFCR practice. Pub. L. No. 92-x26, § 2, 85 Stat. 345.
ss I2 U.S.C.A. § 635 (Supp. 1973)-
12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b) (2) (Supp. 1973).
' White House Fact Sheet at 593.
"6 Presidential Determination No. 72-I8OO, 37 Fed. Reg. 22573 (1972).
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II
SETTLEMENT oF COMMERCIAL DisPuTEs
A. Arbitration
Soviet insistence upon mandatory arbitration under Soviet law has, in the past,
led to a considerable hesitancy on the part of Western businessmen to deal with the
various state trading organizations. The Soviets view arbitration as a desirable
alternative to the "bourgeois" courts of the West. The Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission (FTAC) of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.S.R.,
established in 1932, is the sole Soviet mechanism for arbitration with the commercial
entities of other nations?7 Due to the relative paucity of Soviet-American trade, there
is little substantive law regarding the treatment of the FTAC by our domestic courts.
The notable decision of Amtorg Trading Corpr. v. Camden Fibre Mills, Inc.,28 where-
in an American purchaser fearing unfair treatment by the FTAC sought to have
the arbitration provisions in its contract with Amtorg set aside, has been widely ac-
cepted as standing for the proposition that Soviet arbitration is not per se violation
of public policy. The New York Court of Appeals affirming the lower court noted,
Camden chose to do business with Amtorg and to accept, as one of the conditions
imposed, arbitration in Russia; it may not now ask the courts to relieve it of the con-
tractual obligation it assumed 9
The decision of the New York court was quite favorably received by commentators,
and future FTAC arbitration provisions and enforcement of awards appear to face no
obstacle in New York courts?0
Arbitration was one of the major subjects of the October 1972 Trade Agreement.
A provision of the Agreement provides for third party country arbitration of dis-
putes between state trading companies and U.S. commercial organizations, with
American businesses and their Soviet trading partners choosing a mutually satisfactory
country. In absence of an agreement providing to the contrary, arbitration will be
conducted in a country other than the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. under the arbitration
Rules of the Economic Commission for Europe?1 Thus with regard to arbitration, a
United States enterprise is no longer confronted with FTAC arbitration as a man-
datory concomitant of East-West trade.
B. The Legal Status of East-West Trading Concerns
The jural status of Eastern state trading organizations in the United States has
been rarely called into controversy. American courts have generally subscribed to
" Leff, The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the USSR and the West, 24 AraB. J. (n.s.) i,
2 (8969).
28 304 N.Y. 589, O9 NKE.2d 666 (1952).
" Id. at 521, 809 N..2d at 607. However, the court left the door open to the American company
should the FTAC proceedings be unfair. Id. at 521, iog N.E.2d at 6o8.
" See, e.g., PIs~a 465; Hazard, State Trading and Arbitration in INTERN&A7ONAL TRADE AEBiTRATION
93 (M. Domke ed. 8958).
" US-USSR AGaRErmNr, art. 7.
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a theory of restrictive sovereign immunity in dealing with the instrumentalities of
foreign governments. Therefore, although a state trading organization is an ex-
tension of a foreign government, the nature of its activities strips it of a governmental
character. Hence, sovereign immunity is not deemed appropriate, and state trading
agencies are placed on an equal footing with other litigants 2
In the October 1972 Trade Agreement, the parties agreed that sovereign im-
munity will not be asserted on behalf of commercial instrumentalities of the U.S.S.R.
and, of course, American organizations. The Agreement further provides that each
party will accord the other the right to seek redress in its courts. This provision con-
tains an interesting "jural most-favored-nation" clause to the effect that litigants shall
enjoy the same rights in the courts of the forum party as would a similar litigant
from any third country3 Hence, U.S. trading interests may file, perhaps hes-
itantly, for Soviet adjudication of their rights. It also appears, therefore, with regard
to the Soviet Union and presumably other recognized Soviet bloc governments, that
no obstacles remain to prevent the recognition of state trading organizations as a
proper party plaintiff or defendant in our courts.
The problem of the status of the instrumentalities of unrecognized governments
before our courts appears reasonably settled. In Upright v. Mercury Business
Machines Co.,3" the courts of New York recognized the right of an assignee of an
unrecognized government to sue. The plaintiff in Upright had acquired a trade
acceptance for value drawn on and accepted by the defendant who sought to escape
payment on the grounds that the drawer was the instrumentality of the unrecog-
nized East German government, and, therefore, lacked capacity to sue. The court
never reached the question of whether the instrumentality of a non-recognized gov-
ernment could bring an action in its own name. In holding for the assignee of the
acceptance, however, the court stated,
[i]f the national government does not administratively forbid, or if it facilitates,
the purchase and delivery ... of East German typewriters,... the defendant buyer
will be hard put to show the "illegality" of the underlying transaction, or the
assignment, and thereby avoid payment.3 5
In the recent case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss lena,3 6 the West and East
German Zeiss firms both sought titie to the American "Zeiss" trademarks. While the
West German firm was found to be the legal successor to the trademark rights, the
claims of the East Germans were given full consideration without regard to its status
as an instrumentality of a non-recognized government as urged by the plaintiffs.
The current governmental policy favoring the expansion of East-West trade
32 See Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 369, 387"97
(1959); Setser, The Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24 LAW & CoNtarP.
PRMO. 291 (1959).
11 US-USSR AGREEMFN, art. 7, § 2.
' x3 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (i96r).
" Id. at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
36 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
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should be to maintain the integrity of foreign trade by providing access to our
forums. With the normalization of East-West trade relations, the role of the courts
in the settlement of disputes may be expected to increase as does the flow of com-
merce.
III
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MECHANISM OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
In addition to removing many of the legal obstacles thwarting East-West trade,
the October 1972 Trade Agreement includes provisions that will ease the myriad
difficulties inherent in doing business in a distant and closed society. For instance,
to establish an office in the Soviet Union an organization must be accredited. At the
time of the signing of the Agreement, only two American firms in the fields of travel
and tourism had been accredited. Under the Agreement, American business concerns
will now be allowed accreditation and the right to employ Soviet personnel, use
telecommunications equipment, and perform other necessary commercial functions.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union now plans an expansive trade center including offices,
a first-class hotel, and apartments. A later trade and exposition center is planned,
wherein the United States may lease a pavilion for the display of its products.8 7
To guide American businessmen in their dealings with the Soviets, the United
States will establish a commercial office in Moscow, which will serve to coordinate
transactions with the various state trading agencies. The Soviet Union will, in turn,
establish a trade representation in Washington to serve a liaison function similar
to that of the American commercial office. 8
Trading with a planned economy wherein prices and production are not deter-
mined by a market mechanism may result in severe market disruption. For example,
if Russian razor blades were imported and sold at a price significantly below the
prevailing domestic prices, the demand for these blades, presumably, would be very
high. Were the Soviet Union a capitalistic nation, the lower price may be due to
some natural competitive advantage in the razor blade production, such as a lower
cost of capital, labor, or materials. The price of Soviet exports is not, however,
derived from a market mechanism, but by a governmental determination. Therefore,
a market disruption may not necessarily be based upon a competitive advantage, but
merely an administrative pricing decision. For this reason, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade
Agreement incorporates an anti-market disruption provision to prevent the weaken-
ing of domestic markets from the "artificial" pricing of imports 9
At the time of the signing of the October 1972 Trade Agreement, it was an-
nounced that the parties were progressing on copyright and tax treaties. Further-
more, a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission has been established to monitor
trade relations between the two countries °
7 White House Fact Sheet at 593.
,1 US-USSR AGREEMENT, art. 5 & Annex 2-3.
"I1d. art. 3 & Annex i.
40 White House Fact Sheet at 595-
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Soviet foreign trade has been characterized, in the past, by its almost barter-like
quality.4 ' Before a trade deal is signed, a would-be seller finds himself offered some
commodity in exchange for part or all of his sales price. An arrangement of this
sort, of course, lessens the Soviet need for hard currency and may help reduce do-
mestic surpluses. Although the new Trade Agreement specifies payment is to be
made in United States dollars or any other agreed upon currency, there is no reason
to suspect sellers will not be pressured to exchange their products for Soviet goods.
This philosophy of a non-monetary exchange may underlie the recent agreement
between the Soviet Union and Occidental Petroleum, wherein a fertilizer plant will
be built with American technology and payment will be made in the form of
fertilizer.43 Obviously, the Soviets will prudently seek to barter wherever possible
as it will serve their interests twofold-the increase of exports and the conservation
of hard currency reserves.
CONCLUSION
The October 1972 Trade Agreement has eliminated many of the hurdles that
formerly stood in the path of normalized East-West trade relations. The passage
of the proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 would permit extension of most-favored-
nation status to the Soviet Union, and thereby terminate twenty-two years of eco-
nomic discrimination.
Legislation and diplomatic accords will not, however, lead immediately to the
flow of substantial trade. Understandably, each partner will be somewhat wary of
the other initially and will avoid becoming overly dependent upon the exports of the
other. Aside from whatever ideological qualms harbored by the American business
community, the unfamiliarity of dealing with a state trading organization may deter
all but the most sophisticated enterprises.
Although there are obvious difficulties to be overcome, the prospects for an era
of improved East-West trade relations are excellent, and definitely skewed in favor
of the United States.
SlPmsn 216.
" US-USSR. A EnNT, art. 4.
3 TjM, Apr. 23, 1973, at 72.
